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ANNOUNCEMENT
The REvIEw is pleased to announce the election to the Editorial Board of
the following members of the Third Year Class: S. Samuel Arsht, Louis W.
Cramer, Josiah E. Dubois and John M. Huebner; and of the following members
of the Second Year Class: Arnold I. Coplan, Samuel Edes, Bernard Eskin,
Kenneth W. Gemmill, Fred P. Glick, Louis J. Goffman, Frank E. Hahn, Jr.,
Leonard Helfenstein, Allen J. Levin, Milton N. Nathanson, Harry S. Redeker,
Louis B. Schwartz, Harry E. Sprogell and Arnold Winokur.
NOTES
LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS FOR NEGLIGENT MISIMANAGEMENT-Membership
on the boards of directors of banks and other types of business organizations
is very often regarded as a position of honor, and frequently persons consent
to serve as directors solely because of the prestige and distinction which the
office affords. Likewise, a corporation may seek as directors persons of reputed
success and standing in the community, primarily because of the advantage to
the corporation in having an "illustrious" board of directors held out to the
public as its managers. Such persons may possess little, if any, specialized
training in, or knowledge of, the business of the particular corporation to whose
directorate they are elected. A review of the cases discloses that, unfortunately,
some directors appear to think that they have discharged the duties of their office
simply by being scrupulously honest in their own meager relations with the
corporation. And this, even though, by accepting the office of director, the
law imposes upon them the duty of supervising and directing the management
of the corporate enterprise.'
It is interesting to note at the outset that, although the cases have never
been in accord on the extent of the personal liability of directors, it has never been
doubted that there was some common law duty upon such officers for the
violation of which they would be individually liable in damages to the party
injured.2 The scope of this note will be limited to a consideration of the extent
to which directors will be held personally liable for their negligence in the
management of the corporation.
It is fundamental that, in order to recover from a director on the ground
of negligence, there must have been a preExistent duty to exercise some degree
of care owed by the director to the party seeking to recover damages for its
breach. In order to determine whether or not such a duty exists, and if it does
exist, the precise nature or character of the duty, the courts, with few excep-
tions, have deemed it necessary to determine as a preliminary matter the
nature of the relationship which exists between the director and the party
seeking to enforce the personal liability. Suits against directors for mismanage-
:2 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § IX65. The following provision in the
Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1933) tit. I5,
§ 2852-401, is typical of provisions in the corporation statutes of most of the states: "The
business and affairs of every business corporation shall be managed by a board of at least
three directors .... .
2 In one of the earliest reported cases involving the individual liability of directors for
negligent mismanagement, the liability was enforced. The Charitable Corporation v. Sutton,
2 Atk. 400 (Eng. 1742). The earliest case in America in which the question was considered
is Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. N. S. 68 (La. 1829).
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ment are generally brought by the corporation itself, by a receiver for the cor-
poration, by a shareholder, either in his own behalf or on behalf of all other
shareholders in a representative action, or by a creditor of the corporation, either
in his own behalf or on behalf of all other creditors.
The cases are, and always have been, in conflict on the characterization
which they have ascribed to the status of a director.- Many courts, perhaps the
majority, have declared that a director is a trustee. 4  If he is a trustee, the
question at once arises, who are the cestuis que trustent, the corporation, the
individual shareholders, the creditors, or all of them? Here again there is no
uniformity in the decisions, except that all of the courts which have adopted
the trust classification agree that a director is a trustee at least for the corpora-
tion. Other courts have defined a director as an agent of the corporation.'
No cases have been found by the writer in which a court has gone so far as to
suggest that a director is likewise an agent for the individual shareholders or
creditors of the corporation. Thus, the courts which adhere to the agency
classification have at least avoided some of the difficulties which have confronted
the courts which have adopted the trust classification. Other courts have char-
acterized a director as a mandatory,6 as a managing partner,7 or as a bailee5
However, the cases which have adopted these latter descriptions represent rela-
tively small minority views which appear very infrequently in modern decisions.
There is also to be found a line of cases in which it has been stated that a
director is, at the same time, both an agent and a trustee.' These cases hold
that, as to third persons, the director is an agent of the corporation, but, as to
the corporation itself, he is a trustee.10
The truth of the matter is that a director is neither an agent" nor a
trustee 12 in any strict and complete sense, and either appellation is misleading.
'In the case of The Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, supra note 2, the court referred
to a director as both agent and trustee.
'Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247, 12 N. E. 676 (1887) ; United Society of Shakers v. Under-
wood, 9 Bush 6og (Ky. 1873) ; Pender v. Speight, 159 N. C. 612, 75 S. E. 851 (1912) ; Will-
iams v. McKay, 4o N. J. Eq. 189 (1885) ; Campbell v. Watson, 62 N. J. Eq. 396, So Atl. 120
(19O1); 3 FLErcHra, COPORATIONS (Perm. ed. i93i) § 838; 2 TH[OmPsoN, op. cit. supra
note I, § 1378.
Frontier Milling etc. Co. v. Roy White etc. Co., 25 Idaho 478, 138 Pac. 825 (1914);
Allen v. Cochran, 16o La. 425, 107 So. 292, 5o A. L. R. 459 (1926) ; Ellett v. Newland, 171
La. 1O19, 132 So. 761 (193); Ten Eyck v. Pontiac etc. R. R., 74 Mich. 226, 41 N. W.
9o5 (1889) ; Cairns v. DuPont, 135 Misc. 278, 238 N. Y. Supp. 74 (1929) ; Cameron v. First
Nat. Bank, 194 S. W. 469 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
'Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872) ; Citizen's Bldg. Ass'n v. Coriell, 34 N. J. Eq. 383
(188I) ; Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 23 Atl. 405 (1892).
' London Financial Ass'n v. Kelk, 26 Ch. D. 107 (Eng. 1884) ; Automatic Self-Cleaning
Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd. v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34.
'See Hibernia Bldg. Ass'n v. McGrath, 154 Pa. 296, 304, 26 Ati. 377, 378 (1893).
'McEwen v. Kelly, 14o Ga. 720, 79 S. E. 777 (1913) ; 3 PoIEaoY, EQuITY JURISPRU-
DENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1O89.
"0 Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516 (1927) ; Union Nat. Bank v. Hill, 148
Mo. 380, 49 S. W. 1012 (1899) ; Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163 (19Ol) ;
Gray v. Heinze, 82 Misc. 618, 144 N. Y. Supp. 1045 (xI916), aff'd, 174 App. Div. 924, 16o N.
Y. Supp. 1131 (I916), aff'd, 225 N. Y. 646, 121 N. E. 870 (1ig); Killen v. State Bank, lo6
Wis. 546, 82 N. W. 536 (ioo).
Some authorities have characterized a director as a trustee for creditors, only after the
insolvency of the corporation, but not during its solvency. Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 17o N. Y.
505, 63 N. E. 554 (1902) ; Miller, Liabilities of Directors and Other Officers (1928) 4 IND.
L. J. 183, 187.
U 3 FI.ErcHER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 839.
" Webb v. Cash, 35 Wyo. 398, 25o Pac. 1 (1926); 2 MACHEN, COPORATIONS (1908)
1161; Johnson, Corporate Directors as Trustees in Illinois (1929) 23 ILL L. REv. 653.
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The status of a director is a distinct legal relationship,', and the duties and
obligations incident thereto should be determined in any particular case without
reference to the laws either of trust or agency, except perhaps by analogy."4
In some of the more recent decisions there is a tendency to refrain from labelling
a director categorically either an agent or a trustee, and to characterize him
instead as a quasi-trustee, 5 or simply as a fiduciary." In the final analysis it
must be recognized that the relation of a director to the corporation is sui
generis.Y A director is an officer of the corporation intrusted with its manage-
ment for the benefit of the shareholders as a body, and as such his status is that
of a fiduciary for the corporation's and for its shareholders collectively.'9
It is axiomatic that a fiduciary must exercise some degree of care in the
performance of his obligations. The precise degree of care required of a
director, to which a failure to conform will render him personally liable, will
now be considered. As has already been stated, the decisions of the courts are
far from uniform on this particular problem. However, there are a few
general principles upon which all courts will agree. First, a director is not
bound to exercise the highest possible degree of care in the management of
the corporation.21 Second, he is not liable for an ordinary mistake or error of
judgment.2  Third, he is liable in any event for "gross negligence",2 2 and
gross negligence has been variously defined by different courts as meaning
anything from less diligence than that exercised by a prudent man about his
own affairs23 to that "degree of inattention and want of care indicative either
of wilful recklessness, or intent to defraud or permit others to defraud".
2 4
There are three distinct rules or standards of conduct which the courts
have used in order to determine, in any particular case, whether or not a
director has been guilty of actionable negligence in the management of the
corporation. One view, which has never met with wide approval, and which
12 THoMPsoN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1379; 2 MACHEN, loc. cit. supra note 12; Lynch,
Diligence of Directors in the Management of Corporations (1914) 3 CALIF. L. REv. 2I.
" See Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co. v. Hampson, 23 Ch. D. I, 22 (Eng. 1882); 3
FL'CHER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 847.
" North Carolina Corporation Commission v. Harnett County Trust Co., 192 N. C. 246,
134 S. E. 656 (1926) ; Roscower v. Bizzell, ig N. C. 656, 155 S. E. 558 (193o). "Directors
are not express trustees. . . . At most, they are implied trustees. . . ." Wallace v. Lin-
coln Say. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630, 649, 15 S. W. 448, 453 (1891).
'Lippitt v. Ashley, 89 Conn. 451, 94 Atl. 995 (915) ; Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown,
271 Mass. 132, 171 N. E. 42 (ig3o). Ip both these cases the courts carefully refrained
from labelling directors in the classic manner and merely stated that they occupied the posi-
tion of fiduciaries.
" Johnson, supra note 12.
"The recently enacted Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, supra note I, § 2852-4o8,
defines the status of a director as follows: "Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in
a fiduciary relation to the corporation . . ." This provision is taken verbatim from section
33 of the Uniform Business Corporation Law, 9 U. L. A. 39 (1932), which was put in the
Act for the express purpose of clarifying this confused issue.
3 FLETCHER, loc. cit. supra note 4.
"See Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, supra note 16, at 137, 171 N. E. at 44; 3 CooX,
CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 703.
212 THOmpSON, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 1381, 1382; 2 MACHEN, op. Cit. supra note 12,
§§ 1533, 1534; I MORAWETZ, CORO'RATIONS (2d ed. 1886) § 553. However, it is not every mis-
take of judgment which is excusable. Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65 (188o).
'3 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1033.
"Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, supra note 15. See McEwen v. Kelly, supra note 9, at
723, 79 S. E. at 779, where Lumpkin, J., stated: "Some courts have declared that they are only
liable for gross negligence or breach of duty resulting in injury. But in some, probably most,
of the cases so declaring, it will be found that the failure of directors to use ordinary care in
supervision has been treated as amounting to gross negligence."
213 FLETC iER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1034.
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has practically disappeared in modem cases, is that directors are liable for
"gross negligence" only,2 5 since the compensation which they receive is not
intended to be commensurate with the value of the services which they are
expected to render. The leading case advocating such a standard is Spering's
Appeal26 in which Mr. Justice Sharswood, speaking for the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, stated:
"While directors are personally responsible to the stockholders for
any losses resulting from fraud, embezzlement or wilful misconduct or
breach of trust for their own benefit and not for the benefit of the stock-
holders, for gross inattention and negligence by which such fraud and
misconduct has been perpetrated by agents, officers or co-directors, yet
they are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though they may
appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest and provided
they are fairly within the scope of the powers and discretion confided to
the managing body." sr
There is nothing to commend any doctrine which countenances mistakes of
judgment which are "absurd and ridiculous" when measured by the standard
of ordinary business judgment, simply because the directors acted honestly and
within the scope of their authority.
Opposed to this view is the rule announced in the case of Hun v. Cary,2"
to the effect that directors must exercise in the management of the corporation
that degree of care, skill and diligence which ordinarily prudent men exercise
in the conduct of their own business.2 9  Many of the cases which subscribe to
this standard of conduct liken a director to a trustee of a private trust, and hold
him strictly accountable for his neglect of the corporate affairs.2 0
The third standard prescribes a rule of conduct for directors which requires
a degree of care greater than that required by the first of the above mentioned
rules but somewhat less than the second, and has been adopted by a majority of
the courts which have considered the problem. These courts hold that a director
is bound to exercise that degree of care which ordinarily prudent and diligent
men would exercise under similar circumstances. 31 Under this view, the stand-
ard of duty by which the conduct of a director is to be measured is that set by
the ordinary director, and not that set by the ordinary man.
2  I
However, a careful examination of the decisions reveals that the conflict in
standards is, in most cases, more apparent than real. In the final analysis, each
case must be, and is, decided on its own facts and, in many instances, without
" Spering's Appeal; Citizens' Bldg. Ass'n v. Coriell; Swentzel v. Penn Bank, all supra
note 6.
'Supra note 6.
Spering's Appeal, supra note 6, at 24.
SSupra note 21.
Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 Atl. 621 (igoi) ; BesselievW v. Brown, 177 N. C. 65, 97
S. E. 743 (1919) ; Williams v. McKay; Campbell v. Watson, both supra note 4; Kavanaugh
v. Gould, 223 N. Y. 1O3, 119 N. E. 237 (918).
^' Besseliew v. Brown, supra note 29; Williams v. McKay; Campbell v. Watson, both
supra note 4. "A trustee must in all events use such care as a man of ordinary prudence
itses in his own business of a similar nature." I PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) 737. (Italics
inserted.)
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 1I Sup. Ct. 924 (1891) ; Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.
(2d) 366 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928); Rankin v. Cooper, 149 Fed. ioio (W. D. Ark. 19o7); Mc-
Ewen v. Kelly, supra note 9; Savings Bank of Louisville's Assignee v. Caperton, 87 Ky.
306, 8 S. W. 885 (1888) ; Lippitt v. Ashley; Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, both supra note
16; Devlin v. Moore, 64 Ore. 433, 130 Pac. 35 (1913) ; Conaty v. Torghen, 46 R. I. 447,128
Ati. 338 (1925) ; McCollum v. Dollar, 213 S. W. 259 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919).
I Allen v. Roydhouse, 232 Fed. 1OO (E. D. Pa. 1916).
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reference to the rule of conduct previously announced by the court.33 It must
be borne in mind that the preceding rules are, at most, merely abstract measur-
ing rods, and whether, in a given case, a particular course of conduct constitutes
actionable negligence is a question of fact." It is possible, in many instances,
upon the same state of facts, that different courts, applying the same standard
of care, may reach opposite conclusions,3 5 and likewise, different courts, apply-
ing different standards of care, may reach identical results. In many instances
it may be difficult, if not impossible, to decide in advance of an adjudication
whether, as a matter of law, directors have failed to exercise that degree of
care which will render them individually liable for resultant damages. The
following quotation from a leading text writer represents an accurate analysis
of the problem.
"The plain and obvious rule is, that directors impliedly undertake to
use as much diligence and care as the proper performance of the duties of
their office requires. What constitutes a proper performance of the duties
of a director is a question of fact, which must be determined in each case
in view of all the circumstances; the character of the company, the con-
dition of its business, the usual methods of managing such companies, and
all other relevant facts must be taken into consideration. It is evident
that no abstract reasoning can be of service in reaching a proper solu-
tion." 36
Whatever conflict exists in the decisions is due, in large measure, to the
fact that there are two distinct viewpoints from which the courts have regarded
the problem of the extent of the liability of directors for merely negligent
management of the corporation . 3 7  Many courts have looked at the problem
from the viewpoint of the director, and have attached much weight to the fact
that he receives little or no compensation for his services. They have ex-
pressed the fear that, if the liability imposed for merely negligent conduct is
too severe, it will be difficult to find honest men willing to assume the respon-
sibilities of the office.38 On the other hand, there are those courts which have
viewed the problem primarily from the viewpoint of the public, and have
attempted to protect the interests of the shareholders and creditors of the cor-
poration.39 Although, nominally, the standards of conduct enunciated by the
courts in recent years are the same as they were a half century ago, it is
evident from the decisions that the courts are, in fact, holding the directors
accountable for a higher degree of care, diligence and judgment than did the
courts which first announced the very rules which are being applied today. It
is no longer possible for a director, who has been little more than a figurehead,
' The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Bates v. Dresser, 253 U. S.
524, 40 Sup. Ct. 247 (1920), held that directors were not negligent in failing to examine the
books of a bank, and this conclusion was reached without the aid of any rule or standard of
conduct for directors.
' Briggs v. Spaulding, supra note 31; Burckhardt v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 38 F. (2d)
568 (C. C. A. 9th, 393o) ; cf. Lippitt v. Ashley, supra note 16.
' In Lippitt v. Ashley, supra note I6, both the majority and minority opinions applied the
same standard of conduct for directors but reached different results in applying the facts to
the law.
I MoRAwTrz, op. cit. supra note 21, § 552.
(1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 588.
Spering's Appeal; Citizens' Bldg. Ass'n v. Coriell; Swentzel v. Penn Bank, all supra
note 6; Savings Bank of Louisville's Assignee v. Caperton, supra note 31; Robertson, Lia-
bility of Directors (926) 4 CAN. B. Ray. 358. This view is criticized in 2 THoMPsoN, op.
cit. supra note I, § 1387.
Williams v. McKay; Campbell v. Watson, both supra note 4; Prudential Trust Co. v.
Brown, supra note 16.
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to escape liability for the consequences of his negligence by pleading, when
called to account for his dereliction, that he has acted honestly and in good
faith.4 0 The day of decisions like Spering's Appeal and Briggs v. Spaulding,4
both landmarks in the development of the law on this subject, is definitely past.4"
In their place, are decisions like Lippitt v. Ashley,43 in which the court, though
applying the same standard of conduct as that enunciated by the court in the
Briggs case, nevertheless held the directors liable for a comparatively slight
omission of duty.
44
Assuming that a director has been guilty of actionable negligence, who
are the parties to whom he is liable for his misconduct? There can be no doubt
that the corporation itself is a proper party to enforce the director's personal
liability, since he is a fiduciary for the corporation.4 5 Likewise, a receiver for
the corporation, succeeding to the rights of the corporation, may recover from
the directors for damages sustained by the corporation because of their negli-
gence.46 For the same reason, an individual shareholder may, on behalf of
the corporation, bring a shareholder's representative action against the negligent
directors to obtain redress for a loss which the corporation itself has suffered.
4
1
Under special circumstances, a creditor may, by a creditor's bill, on behalf of all
other creditors, bring an action similar to a shareholder's representative suit
against the negligent directors .
4
Uniformity in the decisions, however, ceases at this point. When the
action is brought by an individual shareholder or creditor of the corporation
in his own behalf, the problem becomes more difficult, and the courts are
divided in the conclusions which they have reached. Here again, the great
majority of courts have deemed it necessary to resort to their preliminary
determination of the category in which the office of director must be placed,
i. e., to the question of whether his status is that of an agent or trustee.
In those jurisdictions where a director has been classified as an agent of
the corporation, it has been held that his relation to the individual shareholders
and creditors of the corporation is exactly the same as the relation which the
agent of any individual bears to the creditors of such individual, and the usual
O Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors (i9o7) 17 YALE L. J. 33.
"Supra note 31. In this case the directors left the entire management of the bank to
the president who embezzled large sums of money and otherwise mismanaged its affairs. The
directors held no meetings for a long period of time.
"For an excellent discussion on the development of the law on this subject in Pennsyl-
vania from the time of Spering's Appeal until 1916, see Rhoads, Personal Liability of Di-
rectors for Corporate Mismanagement (1916) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 128. With the passage of
the new Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, mspra note I, the rule of Spering's Appeal
has been discarded in Pennsylvania, and, nominally at least, directors are now required to
conform to a high standard of conduct. Section 408 of the Act provides: "Officers and di-
rectors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation, and shall discharge
the duties of their respective positions in good faith and with that diligence, care and Ikill
which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in their personal
business affairs."
It is interesting to note that this is a codification of the rule of Hun v. Cary, supra note
21, in which case the rule of Spering's Appeal was severely criticized.
Supra note 16.
The negligence consisted of a failure to require the treasurer of a bank, who, it later
developed, had embezzled funds, to take a trial balance. The trial balance, even, if it had
been taken, would not have disclosed the embezzlement to the directors, because the trial bal-
ance was for the treasurer's use only. The directors were otherwise exceedingly diligent in
their management of the bank.
"2 THo aPsoN, op. cit. supra note I, § 1429; 3 FL'rcHEa, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1276.
2 THompsoN, op. cit. supra note I, § 1431 ; 3 FLECHERa, op cit. supra note 4, § 1277.
"3 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1283.
,Ham v. Norwood, 196 N. C. 763, 147 S. E. 291 (1929).
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principles of liability applicable to an agent have been invoked.4 9 Some of
the decisions which have adopted the agency classification have held flatly that
the individual shareholders and creditors are strangers to the obligation of the
director to exercise care in the management of the corporation, and that only
the corporation, or someone suing in the right of the corporation, can call him
to account for his negligent mismanagement.50 On the other hand, many of
the courts, in order to determine the right of a party to sue, have considered
whether the director has been guilty of "misfeasance or nonfeasance". 5' The
distinction between the two types of conduct is not satisfactory, and, at best, is
tenuous.5 2 Exactly what is meant by either term cannot be stated with accuracy,
and it would be mere conjecture in many instances to determine in advance
whether a given course of conduct constitutes "misfeasance" or "nonfeasance".
Although some courts still make distinctions between these two types of con-
duct5 3 there is a decided tendency in many of the more recent cases to refuse
to distinguish between them, and to hold directors liable for acts of "non-
feasance" as well as for acts of "misfeasance".
54
In those jurisdictions where a director has been characterized as a trustee,
the courts have been faced with different, but equally perplexing, problems.
A variety of answers have been given by different courts in reply to the ques-
tion, "For whom is the director a trustee?" Some courts have said that a
director is a trustee for the individual shareholders as well as for the corpora-
tion, 5 while other courts have held that he is not." Still again, it has fre-
quently been held that a director is also a trustee for the individual creditors,5 '
whereas other courts have expressly denied this.58 It is hardly necessary to
state that, where a director is held to be a trustee for the individual share-
holders and creditors, the latter are entitled to enforce the director's personal
liability for negligence which results in damage to their interests. Conversely,
where it is determined that a director is not a trustee for the individual share-
holders or creditors, it is held that the latter are not proper parties to bring an
action against a negligent director to recover their loss.5 9
The courts have unnecessarily complicated the problem of determining the
parties to whom a director is liable for his negligent mismanagement. By
SWebb v. Cash, supra note 12; Hart v. Evanson, 14 N. D. 570, 105 N. W. 942 (1895).
" Clark v. Lawrence, Fed. Cas. No. 2,827 at 888 (C. C. D. Mass. 1856) ; Allen v. Coch-
ran, supra note 5; Union Nat. Bank v. Hill, supra note IO; Hart v. Evanson, supra note 49;
Daniels v. Berry, 148 S. C. 446, 146 S. E. 42o (1929) ; Deadrick v. Bank of Commerce, NOO
Tenn. 457, 45 S. W. 786 (1898) ; cf. Kelly v. Dolan, 233 Fed. 635 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916); Niles
v. New York etc. R. R., 176 N. Y. 119, 68 N. E. 142 (1903).
' Allen v. Cochran, supra note 5; Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo. 256 (1878); cf. Cairns v.
DuPont, supra note 5.
',Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. 358 (1899) (dis-
tinction criticized).
Allen v. Cochran; Cairns v. DuPont, both supra note 5.
Minnis v. Sharpe, 198 N. C. 364, 151 S. E. 735 (1930) ; 3 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 1161.
I Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903) ; see Delano v. Case; United Society
of Shakers v. Underwood, both supra note 4; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Munday, 297
11 555, 562, 131 N. E. 1O3, 105 (1921).
IBawden v. Taylor, 254 Ill. 464, 8 N. E. 941 (1912) ; Hooker v. Midland Steel Co.,
215 Ill. 444, 74 N. E. 445 (19o5) ; Connolly v. Shannon, O5 N. J. Eq. 155, 147 AtI. 234
(1929) ; 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 848.
"1Delano v. Case, supra note 4; Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896);
see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Munday, suprca note 55; Anthony v. Jeffress, 172 N. C. 378,
9o S. E. 414 (1916) ; Williams v. McKay; Campbell v. Watson, both supra note 4.
0' Webb v. Cash, supra note 12; Daniels v. Berry, supra note 5o; Hart v. Evanson, supra
note 49; Union Nat. Bank v. Hill, supra note IO.
0 Union Nat. Bank v. Hill, supra note Io.
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deciding in advance that a director is an agent or a trustee for certain parties,
the courts have assumed that which is necessary to be proved, iz., the existence
of any duty on the part of the director to the individual shareholders or cred-
itors to exercise care in the management of the corporation. Bearing in mind
that this note deals with the liability of directors for negligence only, and not
for fraud or deceit, this is the fundamental and, in fact, the only question
involved, at least as far as the question of parties is involved.
There are two types of losses which individual shareholders or creditors
may suffer as a result of the negligence of the directors. First, and by far the
most frequent, are those losses which fall upon all shareholders and creditors
in like measure, because the corporation itself has, in the first instance, been
injured. The individual shareholders and creditors have been affected only
indirectly. If the corporation is not rendered insolvent, the creditors would
suffer no loss. Likewise, a recovery by an individual shareholder or creditor
would not bar the right of the corporation to recover from the directors,", and
this would result substantially in a double recovery for the shareholder. A
director owes a duty to refrain from negligent conduct which results in a
primary injury to the corporation to the corporation itself and the shareholders
collectively, if there is any distinction between the two. Where the loss is of
this nature, the right to recover is an asset vested in the corporation itself or in
some one suing in its right."1
A second type of loss which an individual may suffer as a result of the
negligence of the directors is one which is peculiar to himself, and which has
not fallen in like measure on all other shareholders and creditors of the cor-
poration. The most common illustration of this type of injury is the situation
where, due to the negligence of the directors, the corporation has published a
false report of its financial condition, and certain individuals, in reliance thereon,
have been induced either to purchase shares of stock in the corporation or to
extend credit to it. In such a situation the corporation itself has suffered no
injury. On the contrary it has, in fact, benefited. The loss has fallen directly
upon the individual shareholders and creditors who had relied upon the false
reports and upon no others. Therefore, such persons should be entitled to
bring an action, in their own right, against the directors for negligence in per-
mitting the false reports to be circulated. 63 An action of this kind borders
upon and strongly resembles an action on the case for fraud and deceit. While
a director owes a duty to no one other than the corporation to refrain from
negligently dissipating, or permitting to be dissipated, the assets of the cor-
poration; he does owe a duty to third parties to refrain from negligently creating
a situation, or permitting a situation to exist, which will induce such persons to
deal with the corporation in reliance thereon and to their detriment.
63
S. S. A.
RELIANCE UPON AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE AS A DEFENSE TO
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION-The question may arise whether the defendant in a
criminal action may successfully offer as a defense the fact that his allegedly
criminal conduct conformed to the provisions of a statute which has since been
c 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1282.
'Bailey v. Mosher, 63 Fed. 488 (C. C. A. 8th, t894) ; Kelly v. Dolan, supra note 5o;
Besseliew v. Brown, supra note 29; Douglass v. Dawson, 19o N. C. 458, I3o S. E. 395 (1925);
Note (1932) 2o CALIF. L. REv. 426; Note (i93o) 8 N. C. L. Ray. 459.
" Frontier Milling etc. Co. v. Roy White etc. Co.; Cameron v. First Nat. Bank, both
supra note 5; Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C. 365, 29 S. E. 827 (i898) ; Childs v. White,
158 App. Div. 1, 142 N. Y. Supp. 732 (913); Seale vf Baker, 7o Tex. 283, 7 S. W. 742
(1888) ; Cassidy v. Uhlmann, supra note 10.
" Cameron v. First Nat. Bank, supra note 5 (action brought by creditor) ; Childs v.
White, supra note 62 (action brought by shareholder).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
declared unconstitutional. For example, a statute creates a crime, and a later
statute purports to repeal it. X, believing that the repeal is effective, acts in a
manner forbidden by the first statute. The repealing statute is later declared
unconstitutional by the highest court of the state.- Can X be convicted of the
violation of the first statute? What statute was in effect prior to the declaration
of unconstitutionality? The present prominence of recent social legislation, the
constitutionality of which has yet to be tested, suggests an investigation of the
possibility of basing defenses upon reliance upon an unconstitutional statute.
2
It must first be determined what the status of an unconstitutional statute
is, in the period prior to the declaration of its unconstitutionality s when there
is no reliance upon its supposed validity. In civil cases, there appears to be a
divergence of authority. Some courts hold that in that period it is the law of
the land, ihe basis of rights and duties; - other courts hold that it is "without
legal effect, null and void",5 and allow no defenses based upon it, unless the
plaintiff for some reason may be found to have "estopped" himself from plead-
ing the unconstitutionality of the statute.6 Without commitment to the proposi-
tion that in the criminal law an unconstitutional statute is in reality "null and
void",' as some judicial utterances would indicate, it may simply be stated that
the cases uniformly hold (I) that there may be no valid conviction founded
upon an unconstitutional statute,8 and (2) that an unconstitutional statute,
purporting to repeal an existent statute and substitute a new set of social rules,
does not repeal the existent statute, irrespective of the ground on which the
second statute was declared unconstitutional. 9
'The discussion is limited to cases where the statute is declared totally unconstitutional.
The effect of partial unconstitutionality is necessarily a separate consideration. Reliance upon
the statute may be actual or implied. The courts apparently make nto distinction between
cases where the defendant actually knew of the repealing statute, and cases where the de-
fendant's conduct was unconsciously in conformity with it. In the latter cases he is said to
be "presumed to know" of the statute. See Continental Supply Co. v. Abell, 24 Pac. (2d)
133 (Mont. 1933).
'For treatments of the general subject, see Field, Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute
(1926) 1 IND. L. J. i; Note (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 373; Note (1932) 6 CiN. L. REv. 185:
Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1140.
' The prima facie validity of the statute, which may operate to rebut the presumption of
knowledge of the law, ceases at the moment the supreme court declares the statute invalid.
Woolsey v. Dodge, 6 McLean 142 (C. C. Ohio, 1854); Titus v. Poland Coal Co., 275 Pa.
431, 1i1 Atl. 540 (2923).
'Lang v. Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 68 Atl. 9o (19o7); Beaver v. Hall, 42 Tenn. 416,
217 S. W. 649 (292o).
' Norwood v. Goldsmith, 168 Ala. 224, 53 So. 84 (292o) ; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige,
83 N. Y. 178 (i88o).
For an example of this rather frequent practice, see the case of Jensen v. Jensen, 92
Colo. 169, 18 Pac. (2d) ioi6 (2933).
' For support of the thesis that the existence of the crime is dependent on the ability of
the state to punish, see the holdings of Ex parte Taft, 284 Mo. 531, 225 S. W. 457 (1920) ;
Mossew v. United States, 266 Fed. 18 (C. C. A. 2d, 292o) ; Commonwealth v. Smith, 266 Pa.
511, iog Atl. 786 (292o) ; State v. Truax, 130 Wash. 69, 226 Pac. 259 (2924). One of the
commonest illustrations of the thesis is the fact that after a repealing statute becomes effec-
tive, unless such statute contains a saving clause, no convictions may be obtained for viola-
tions of the repealed statute, on the ground that the authority to punish must exist at the time
the sentence is to be imposed. People v. Brown, 273 IIl. 16q, 112 N. E. 462 (i9i6) ; De Four
v. United States, 26o Fed. 596 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919) (saving clause).
' Gandy v. State, 162 Ala. 678, 49 So. 8Ol (iog) ; Norwood v. State, 136 Miss. 272, 10
So. 366 (2924) ; McFarlin v. State, 123 S. W. 133 (Tex. Cr. App. 19o9) ; Snyder v. State,
57 S. W. (2d) 855 (Tex. Cr. App. 1933); Venn v. State, 210 S. W. 534 (Tex. Cr. App.
2919).
" See Note (930) 66 A. L. R. 1483. If, however, the intention of the legislature to re-
peal irrespective of the validity of the substitutionary statute is manifest, the courts will
declare that the first statute is repealed. Meshmeier v. State, i Ind. 482 (1858) ; Ely v.
Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 981 (Ky. 282o).
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These considerations are persuasive that an unconstitutional criminal
statute may never properly be regarded as binding law. The defendant is
therefore not permitted to say that in relying upon the seemingly valid statute
he was conforming to "the law of the land". In consequence, the nature and
legal efficacy of the defendant's belief that he was acting in a manner socially
desirable and legally sanctioned must be investigated.
I. The Nature of the Defendant's Belief
A person may erroneously believe in one of two ways that his conduct is
legally sanctioned: he may either be under what is juristically described as a
"mistake of law" or as a "mistake of fact". It would seem that a proper
distinction between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law is that in the former
situation the actor is under a false impression as to the existence or character
of an entity in the outside world, while in the latter situation he is under a false
impression as to the existence or character of the relations between an entity in
the outside world and himself.' 0 If this premise be accepted, it should follow
that the defendant, in believing that an invalid statute was legally in effect, was
under a mistake of law, since he believed that by virtue of that statute he had
a right to deal in a certain manner with known entities.
The application of the doctrine generally accepted in the criminal law,
ignorantia legis non, excusat, is immediately suggested. An unconstitutional
statute, never operative, it may be claimed, is no basis for rights or defenses.
Intimations to this effect are fairly frequent in judicial rationalization." A
concise statement of the thought appears in State v. Greer: 12
"The courts have no power to make a statute inoperative only from
the date of an adjudicated invalidity, because the courts merely adjudge
that a statute conflicts with organic law, and the Constitution then operates
to make the statute void from its enactment, the courts having no power
to control the operation of the Constitution. It is not material whether
the courts adjudge a statute to conflict with an express provision, or with
a necessarily implied provision of the Constitution, since, if a conflict with
organic law is adjudged, it is equally effective to let the Constitution nullify
the statute . .
"A belief, according to criminal jurisprudence, may be either as to the existence of a
"law" or of a "fact". If that belief be mistaken, it is classified accordingly as a "mistake
of law" or as a "mistake of fact". A distinction between the two is certainly difficult. In a
sense, it may be declared that the existence of a law is just as much a fact as the existence
of any other thing. But the law has been regarded as a system, a method, a process of rea-
soning, evidenced, it is true, by concrete holdings, but nevertheless vaster and more abstract.
The distinction advocated in the text may be elucidated by two illustrations. (i) A, reason-
ably believing B, his servant, to be a burglar, shoots and kills B. A is not guilty of the
murder of B. (2) A, believing that he has a right to kill B because B is subject to him as
his servant, shoots and kills B. A is guilty of the murder of B. In (I), although it is true
that A intended to shoot the man before him at the time he shot, he may negative this prima
facie criminal intent by showing that his intent to kill a burglar caused his intent to kill his
servant. In (2), he can only show that a belief that he had a right to kill his servant caused
him to intend to kill his servant. In (i), he negatives his prima facie criminal intent by a
nonculpable intent: in (2), he merely colors his prima facie criminal intent by a belief. For
it may be stated as axiomatic that a person only intends in regard to definite entities; that
he never really intends in regard to intangibles. There is therefore no inconsistency in the
refusal of the criminal law to attach the same weight to the two kinds of mistake as defenses.
n Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 156 Ga. 789, i2O S. E. 120 (1923) ; Cohen v. City of
Henderson, 182 Ky. 658, 207 S. W. 4 (1918).
288 Fla. 249, 264, IO2 So. 739, 745 (1924).
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But despite the doctrine of ignorantia legis non excusat, despite the oft-repeated
rhetoric that everyone is presumed to know the law,1" it would appear that in
certain situations valid defenses may be based upon the fact that the defendant
relied upon the provisions of an unconstitutional statute.
II. The Adequacy of a Defense Based Upon Reliance When the Statute Has
Never Been Adjudged Valid
It is patent that no authoritative answer can be given to the question of
the defendant's criminal responsibility which does not take into account the
peculiar nature of the statute under which he is indicted, and the common law
background thereof. Generalizations must therefore be made with extreme
caution. The peculiarities of the criminal mens rea of particular groups of
crimes must be noticed.
(a) There are statutes providing in effect that the mere commission of a
proscribed act may constitute a crime.14  Even a reasonable mistake of fact
cannot excuse in such case.15 Most of the cases where belief in the validity of
an unconstitutional statute was not allowed as a defense are cases dealing with
such laws-violations of license laws 16 and state liquor laws.-
7 An illustrative
recent case is that of Dupree v. State.' s The defendant was indicted for shoot-
ing squirrels in a closed season. He pleaded that his conduct was proper under
a statute which purported to repeal the statute under which he was indicted.
The repealing statute was declared unconstitutional because it was special legis-
lation, and the conviction sustained. 9
(b) In the case of Godwin v. State' 0 the defendants were indicted for
failing to perform their duties as public officials. They pleaded that they had
refrained from acting in the particular instance because a statute had relieved
them of their duties. The statute had later been declared unconstitutional.
The upper court held that the defendants should not be convicted. The holding
of the case suggests that wherever a person is under a duty to act, there is a
judicial disposition to hold that he is not liable criminally for failure to act, if he
reasonably believed that his duty did not arise in the particular situation.
2 ' To
hold otherwise would be to place a premium upon tenure of office.
"See Jacksonville Public Service Corp. v. Calhoun Water Co., 239 Ala. 616, 123 So. 79
(1929) ; State v. Boyett, 32 N. C. 336 (1849).
" The policy behind the statute is determinative of its character. State v. Laundy, 103
Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922). Punishment of a person for an act in violation of law, when
he is ignorant of the facts making it so, does not deny due process of law. United States v.
Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 42 Sup. Ct. 301 (1922). The mere commission of a proscribed act
may constitute a crime. Landen v. United States, 299 Fed. 75 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) ; State v.
McLean, 121 N. C. 589, 28 S. E. 140 (897).
"Schuster v. State, 48 Ala. i99 (1872) ; Gately v. Taylor, 211 Mass. 6o, 97 N. E. 6x9
(1912).
16Ex parte Davis, 21 Fed. 396 (C. C. D. Ky. 1884) ; Camden v. State, 56 N. J. L. 244,
28 Ati. 82 (1893) ; Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore, 39 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 511, 2o App. Div. 242
(1922).
"7Barker v. State, 118 Ga. 35, 44 S. E. 874 (3903).
184 Ark. 1120, 44 S. W. (2d) 3097 (932).
Other instances: Ex parte Masters, 126 Okla. 80, 258 Pac. 86I (3927) (conviction for
violation of speed law) ; State v. Ehr, 57 N. D. 310, 221 N. W. 883 (1928) (conviction for
violation of a "police power" act). See Note (393o) 66 A. L. R., supra note 9. Repudiations
of the rule allowing convictions may be found in Lang v. Bayonne, supra note 4; State v.
Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 (1873).
"323 N. C. 697, 31 S. E. 221 (I898).
2'A striking illustration of the force of this proposition may be found in the recent case
of Burns v. State, 61 S. W. (2d) 512 (Tex. Cr. App. 1933). That reliance on an unconsti-
tutional statute may serve to show that the defendant did not act maliciously, see Birsall v.
Smith, 158 Mich. 390, 122 N. W. 626 (19o9) (civil action for malicious prosecution).
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With greater force may it be said that in all crimes among whose necessary
mental elements are knowledge, fraud, or malice, reliance upon a statute, later
declared unconstitutional, is a good defense. So, in a prosecution for larceny,
it should be sufficient to show by way of defense that by virtue of an unconsti-
tutional statute the defendant believed the goods he asported were his own,
since one of the mental constituents of the crime of larceny is the intent of the
defendant to deprive another of his property.
(c) A statute, purportedly repealing another statute, may substitute a lower
standard of conduct as the test of due care in a particular situation. If that
later statute Le unconstitutional, may the defendant nevertheless plead belief in
its validity as a defense in a prosecution under the repealed statute? The
answer is found in the recent case of Claybrook v. State.22 This was a prosecu-
tion for involuntary manslaughter. The defendant had been one of the drivers
in a fatal automobile accident. He had been driving at a rate of speed author-
ized by a speed law which was later declared unconstitutional for some technical
reason. The invalidity of the speed law had the effect of continuing an existent
statute which did not permit the rate of speed at which the defendant was
driving. The conviction was set aside. It was held that "criminal responsibility
may not be predicated on the theory that the subsequently determined uncon-
stitutionality of the speed law rendered it void ab initio so that the defendant,
if driving however slightly above the former speed law when the fatal collision
took place, was guilty of criminal negligence." 23
(d) To constitute a criminal inens rea in a particular crime, it may only be
necessary that the defendant intend certain prohibited consequences to ensue
from his physical expression. May the manifest existence of this intent be
"negatived" or disregarded by a showing that his intentional conduct was the
product of reliance upon an unconstitutional statute? For example, an inten-
tional killing without sufficient provocation is murder. A statute declares that
in case of an unwarranted assault, the person assaulted may stand his ground,
and use all means necessary to resist the assault. X, believing the statute to be
valid, does not retreat when he is attacked, and kills his assailant in the combat
which follows. The statute is later declared unconstitutional and X is indicted
for the murder of his assailant, on the ground that he was bound to retreat under
the existent law.
All of the cases involving crimes based upon intent appear to concern de-
fendants who have violated both repealed and repealing statutes.2 4  In such
cases the defendant could obviously not have relied upon the repealing statute.
There is no indication, therefore, as to the effect of reliance in this situation.
It is doubtful, however, that there should be a conviction, if the defendant's
belief in the legality of his conduct was bona fide and reasonable, and if, at the
same time, his conduct appealed to the moral sense of the court. The question,
it must be admitted, remains unanswered by present adjudication.
2
5
= 164 Tenn. 440, 443, 51' S. W. (2d) 499, 499 (1932).
m Prosecution for failure to perform a statutory duty may be placed in the same category.
But inasmuch as many courts are inclined to say that knowledge of an official, and not merely
unreasonableness of belief, is a component of the crime, such cases are placed in (b).
Rotner v. State, 55 S. W. (2d), 98 (Tex. Cr. App. 1932) ; State v. Boylston, 138 La.
21, 69 So. 86o (i915).
" Some of the cases cited under section (a), where a conviction is allowed, may belong
in the group of cases dealing. vith crimes based upon intent as in (d). It is not clear from
the cases whether or not a criminal intent is required. Mere belief in the unconstitutionality
of a statute is no defense. Hunter v. State, 158 Tenn. 63, 12 S. W. (2d) 361 (1928).
Ignorance of the existence of a statute is no defense. Commonwealth v. Liberty Products
Co., 84 Pa. Super. 473 (1925). But where such belief or ignorance shows that the defend-
ant did not have one of the necessary mental components of a crime, it makes for a good
defense. United States v. One Buick Coach Automobile, 34 F. (2d) 318 (N. D. Ind. i929).
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III. The Adequacy of a Defense Based on Reliance When the Statute Has
Been Adjudged Valid
Suppose that the highest court of the jurisdiction, at some time prior to
the defendant's reliance, has declared the part of the statute upon which the
defendant relied, to be constitutional. It would seem that by virtue of this
decision the defendant is more adequately protected in case the statute should
later be declared unconstitutional. Most courts even go so far as to say that
there may be a valid defense in prosecutions for crimes which do not require a
inens rea.26 Such decisions indicate that reliance upon a judicial decision de-
daring a statute constitutional incapacitates the reliant actor to commit a crime,
just as does insanity or nonage.
If, therefore, a good defense is possible on grounds of reliance, where no
mens rea is required for a particular crime, a fortiori, where knowledge, malice,
or fraud 27 must be shown, the defendant's bona fide reliance makes a good
defense. It would also appear that the defendant has a good defense in crimes
based upon criminal intent as in (d) of the foregoing section.2 s
One important qualification must be made to the otherwise complete pro-
tection which reliance upon a statute previously declared constitutional affords.
The court must be satisfied as to the moral credit of the defendant's conduct.
2 9
In Bishop's Ne, Criminal Law,30 it is declared that, while no change in con-
struction should be adopted which would have the effect to punish a man for an
act in itself innocent, and which had theretofore been adjudged as not within
the restraint of a statute, since such overturning of an established doctrine would
be too much in the nature of ex post facto judicial legislation, yet, if what a man
did was nmum in se, so that he was conscious of wickedness in so doing it,
there would be no weighty objection to overruling the former doctrine if clearly
wrong.
The decisions holding that reliance is a good defense when the statute has
previously been adjudged constitutional are sometimes rested on the proposi-
tion that the doctrine of stare decisis prevents a retrospective application of
the later decision,31 sometimes on broader grounds of justice,3 2 admitting a
plain exception to the doctrine, ignorantia legis non excusat. But the prior de-
cision, to make for a valid defense, must be a declaration by the highest court
of the jurisdiction that the statute is constitutional. The decision of a lower
court is insufficient.33
It may seem a paradox that reliance upon a statute judicially declared
constitutional is more potent as a defense than reliance upon a statute that has
"State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N. W. 454 (igio) ; Ingersoll v. State, ii Ind. 464
(1858). Contra: Boyd v. State, 53 Ala. 6oi (1875).
-Lutwin v. State, 97 N. J. L. 67, 17 Atl. 164 (1922); People v. Kamhout, 227 Mich.
172, 198 N. W. 831 (924) ; State v. Evertz, 190 S. W. 287 (Mo. 1916).
'Odom v. State, 132 Miss. 3, 95 So. 253 (3923). On the general subject, see Note
(I911) 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 788.
"Lanier v. State, 57 Miss. 102 (879) ; State v. Fulton, 149 N. C. 485, 63 S. E. 115
(1908).
i BIsHoP, NEw CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 3923) §§ 95, 96 and 295.
People v. Tompkins, 186 N. Y. 413, 79 N. E. 326 (39o6) ; State v. Longino, iop Miss.
325, 67 So. 902 (1915). See also Grubbs v. State, 24 Ind. 295 (865).
' State v. O'Neil, supra note 26; Lutwin v. State, supra note 27. The constitutional pro-
vision against ex post facto legislation applies only to legislative acts, not to changes in de-
cisions by courts in criminal cases with a retroactive effect. Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S. 15o,
33 Sup. Ct. 220 (1913).
" State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 1318, 210 N. W. 137 (1926) ; State v. Stevenson, 98 Ore.
285, 193 Pac. 1O3O (392o). Reliance upon an injunction is insufficient. State) v. Wadhams
Oil Co., 149 Wis. 58, 134 N. W. 1121 (1932).
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never been so declared. But the rule is only one illustration of the oft-asserted
supremacy of law over government, of the judiciary over the legislature.3 4
Conclusion
Surely the conduct of a person who relies upon an apparently valid statute
should be excused, in all cases. The courts themselves recognize a strong pre-
sumption in favor of the validity of a statute 35: they are unwilling, unless the
necessity to decide the case before them demands, to question the constitu-
tionality of any statute; they strive, wherever possible, to uphold it as con-
stitutional . 7 By this policy they prolong the period of possible reliance, and
often create the situation which comes before them for adjudication. It is
important that the cause of the defendant's ignorance of the law should be
considered. 38
No resort may reasonably be had to the sophistry that no one is bound to
obey an invalid statute.39 For by hypothesis the reliant actor has no reasonable
means of knowing that the statute is unconstitutional. As is stated in the case
of Lang v. Bayonne,40
"To require the citizen to determine for himself, at his peril, to what
extent, if at all, the Legislature has overstepped the boundaries defined by
the Constitution in passing this mass of statutes, would be to place upon
him an intolerable burden, one which it would be absolutely impossible for
him to bear,-a duty infinitely beyond his ability to perform. In my
opinion, the provisions of a solemn act of the Legislature, so long as it has,
not received judicial consideration, are as binding upon its citizens as is the
judgment of a court rendered against him so long as it remains unreversed."
There should be no conviction in any case where the defendant has based his
conduct upon the provisions of a statute. R.H.S.
RIGHT OF SURFvACE OWNER TO HAVE His BUILDINGS SUPPORTED BY THE
SUBJACENT LAN---The common law gives every landowner certain rights in
reference to uses of other land that affect the use and enjoyment of his land.
These rights, incident to the ownership of land and not dependent on any agree-
ment between the owners of the dominent and servient lands, are, in this
country, generally known as "natural rights".' They owe their existence to
the fact that, without them, a landowner might be, in part or in whole, deprived
of the use and enjoyment of his land,2 a result not only unacceptable to him but
also opposed to a public policy favoring the occupation and utilization of all
land. Two of these "natural rights" are the right of the landowner to have his
I See DIcKINSON, ADmINIsTRATIvE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMIACY OF THE- LAW (1927)
c. 2.
Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 255 U. S. 288, 41 Sup. Ct. 272
(1921) ; Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U. S. 158, 39 Sup. Ct. 35 (1918).
" Aikins v. Kingsbury, 247 U. S. 484, 38 Sup. Ct. 558 (191&) ; Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923).
" New York Central R. R. v. Chisholm, 268 U. S. 29, 45 Sup. Ct. 402 (1925).
(1933) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 1003.
"The real problem is whether the defendant may rely on the statute.
'0 Supra note 4, at 46o, 68 Atl. at 92.
1TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1912) §§ 295-303.2 1d. § 295.
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land supported by the adjacent land, and the right of the surface owner to have
his surface supported by the subjacent land.3 The right of any landowner to
have his land supported by other land is not, of course, violated if the owner
of the other land substitutes for a natural support a sufficient artificial support.
Any reference, therefore, in this note to "support by other land" means,
unless the context otherwise requires, support by natural land or some substitute
therefor.
The common law gives every landowner a right of action against one who,
by excavating or improving the adjacent land, causes the land in its natural
state to sink.4 Cases have held that the natural right to support by adjacent
land does not include a right of support for land which has had placed upon it
an additional weight such as a building.5 Where ownership of surface land is
in one person, and ownership of subjacent land, or minerals therein, is in
another, the owner of the former has a natural right of support from the
subjacent land or minerals, and consequently may recover damages if injured
by the withdrawal of such support.' Textwriters 7 and many dicta 8 in cases
are to the effect that this natural right to subjacent support, however, like that
to lateral support, exists in favor of land in its natural state only, and the owner
of the lower stratum is under no obligation to furnish support for buildings in
addition to the land. The writer has found no cases actually holding that
buildings erected on the surface are or are not entitled to support by the sub-
jacent land.9 Under what circumstances should a landowner have the right to
have his buildings supported by subjacent land?
Excluding problems arising under acquisition by prescription, estoppel, or
statutes, this question may arise in the following situations:
I. Where there is an express grant by the owner of the subjacent land to
the surface owner, giving the surface owner, under certain or all conditions, the
right to have his building supported.
2. Where there is a "release" by the surface owner to the owner of the
subjacent land of any duty, under certain or all conditions, to support the
building.
3. Where there is no express grant or "release", and there is no evidence
sufficient to establish a parol agreement, i. e., an agreement not under seal,
between the parties in regard to support of the building.
4. Where there is no express grant or "release" but there is evidence
sufficient to establish a parol agreement regarding support of the building, the
'Id. § 3O.
'Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220 (1815) ; Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (876);
Richardson v. Vermont Cent. R. R., 25 Vt. 465 (1853). See Wyatt v. Harrison, 3 Barn. &
Adol. 871 (Eng. 1832); Turnstall v. Christian, 8o Va. 1 (1885); Moody v. McClelland, 39
Ala. 45 (1863) ; Charles v. Rankin, 22 Mo. 566 (1856).
'Thurston v. Hancock, supra note 4; Gilmore v. Driscoll, supra note 4; Lasala v. Hol-
brook, 4 Paige 169 (N. Y. 1833) ; Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92 (N. Y. 1819) ; Turnstall
v. Christian, supra note 4; Wyatt v. Harrison, supra note 4. See Moody v. McClelland,
supra note 4; Charles v. Rankin, supra note 4; Northern Transportation Co. v. City of Chi-
cago, 99 U. S. 635 (1878).
'Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739 (Eng. 1850) ; Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ili. 464 (1880);
Carlin v. Chappel, ioi Pa. 348 (1882). See Marvin v. Brewster Iron Min. Co., 55 N. Y. 538
(1874).
I TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note I, 672; GODDARD, EASEMiENTS (5th ed. I896) 67.
8 See Marvin v. Brewster Iron Min. Co., supra note. 6; Wilms v. Jess, supra note 6;
Jackson Hill Co. v. Bales, 183 Ind. 276, io8 N. E. 962 (9,5) ; Morris v. Coal Co., 211 Ill
App. I86 (1918).
IEven the cases cited by the text writers as holding that the natural right of subjacent
support exists only in favor of the land in its natural state do not actually so hold but merely
contain dicta to that effect. See TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, 672.
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agreement being capable of specific performance. This situation is, in effect,
the same as either the first or the second, depending on the nature of the agree-
ment.10
5. Where there is no express grant or "release" but there is evidence
sufficient to establish a parol agreement regarding support of the building, the
agreement being incapable of specific performance.
Where there is an express grant or "release" of support of the building it
would doubtless everywhere be controlling. Even assuming it renders prac-
tically impossible the occupation and utilization of either the surface or the
subjacent land, the public policy favoring occupation and utilization of that
land would not be regarded by courts as sufficient to vitiate an express grant.
Where there is neither an express grant or "release" nor evidence sufficient
to establish a parol agreement between the parties regarding support of build-
ings erected on the surface, it is the opinion of the writer that the so-called
doctrine of easement of necessity should be applicable. The surface owner
should normally have an easement of support by necessity in the subjacent
land in favor of his land and the buildings thereon, certainly insofar as the
buildings constitute a reasonable use of the land. It is no doubt true that courts
generally have not applied the doctrine of easement of necessity in the sub-
jacent support cases,1 and it has even been said by Professor Simonton, that
the right of subjacent support cannot be an easement.12 To determine the
applicability of the doctrine of easement of necessity, and, if applicable, the
nature and extent of the easement right gained, the reason for, and the theory
of, the doctrine must be examined.
It is generally recognized that the real basis for the doctrine is public
policy.' 3 It is to the interest of the state that all land should be fully utilized.
In Packer v. Welstead,'4 in 1658, in which a way of necessity, by far the most
common instance of an easement of necessity, was allowed, Chief Justice Glyn
said, "But the jurors having found it to be a way of necessity, it seems to me
that the way remains, for it is not only a private inconvenience, but it is also to
the prejudice of the public weal, that land should lie fresh and unoccupied." 15
This decision has ever since represented the law.
Easements of necessity are generally based on the theory of implied grant
or implied reservation. 6 As has been pointed out by Professor SimontonY7
this attempt to base the easement on the presumed intent of the parties was
probably due to the mode of juristic thinking of the period. During the 19 th
century, it was considered that rights arose because of the exercise of the wills
'o If the parol agreement is written and there is sufficient consideration, or is oral and has
been sufficiently acted on, to render it capable of specific performance, the practical effect,
for this purpose, is the same as though it had been performed, i. e., as though there had been
a grant or a release.
'See however Humphries v. Brogden, supra note 6, in which the right of the surface
owner to support from the subjacent strata was based on implied grant, apparently because
of the necessity.
2 Simonton, Ways by Necessity (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 571, 592. Professor Simonton
argues that the right of subjacent support cannot be said to be an easement since clearly the
right of support, being an incident to the ownership, would not violate a covenant against in-
cumbrances (he cites no cases). Even though it be assumed, as Professor Simonton ap-
parently does, that all easements violate a covenant againt incumbrances, still his argument
does no more than beg the question.
" Simonton, supra note II, at 574.
14 2 Sid. 39 (Eng. 1658). A translation will be found in 3 GRAY, CASES ON PROPERTY (2
vol. ed. 19o6) 347.
2Id. at iii. Italics inserted.
10 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra note I, at 714.
17 Simonton, supra note ii, at 576.
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of individuals. As a result there was a strong tendency to reduce everything
in the nature of a legal transaction to a contract. As is pointed out by Pro-
fessor Bohlen,"" this tendency led the courts to refer all possible obligations to
the consent of the party on whom they were imposed. As a result, voluntary
assumption of risk, the fellow servant rule, and the like, were based on some
implied terms of contract. So it is not strange to find easements by necessity
based on implied contracts, i. e., implied grants or implied reservations. The
easement was, and still is, by most courts, regarded as resulting on the theory
that the grantor and grantee of the land intend that it shall exist, and courts
merely declare that the particular circumstances of the transaction raise a pre-
sumption of such an intention. The necessity of the situation is regarded as
evidence of the intention of the parties.
"For the law will not presume that it was the intention of the parties
that one should convey land to the other, in such manner that the grantee
could derive no benefit from the conveyance; nor that he should so convey
a portion so as to deprive himself of the enjoyment of the remainder. The
law, under such circumstances, will give effect to the grant according to the
presumed intent of the parties." 19
It is to be noted however that, though the grantee knew nothing of the
dominant tenement at the time of the grant, yet his land will be burdened with
an easement; and a covenant of warranty in his deed does not prevent the
implication of the easement. 20  It is evident that the easement by necessity is
imposed, regardless of the knowledge of the parties as to the circumstances,
and regardless of their actual intent, unless there is evidence sufficient to prove
a contrary intent.2
While the doctrine is really based on considerations of public policy, the
theory that the easement of necessity arises because of the intent of the parties
has frequently influenced the result reached. As a consequence, the result has
not always been in accord with the underlying public policy. 22 For example,
cases have held that mere necessity alone is not sufficient to give rise to such an
easement, and that the party claiming the easement must allege and prove that
title to both was derived from a common owner.2 3 Also it has been held that,
since the easement is based on the presumed intent of the parties, evidence of a
parol agreement of the parties to the contrary is admissible to rebut the pre-
sumption of intention.2 4
What degree of necessity must be shown to establish the easement? By
the weight of authority there must be a strict necessity-a reasonable necessity
or convenience is not sufficient.2 5 This strict necessity is probably a result of
Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk (19o6) 20 H~Av. L. REV. 14, 31-32.
"Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39, 44 (1842).
' Powers v. Heppman, 233 Ill. 597, 84 N. E. 661 (19o8) ; Vandalia R. R. v. Fumas, 182
Ind. 306, lo6 N. E. 402 (1914) ; Brigham v. Smith, 70 Mass. 297 (1855).
'See Simonton, supra note II, at 575. The effect of evidence proving a contrary intent
will be discussed later.
. Simonton, supra note ii, at 579.
" Stewart v. Hartman, 46 Ind. 331 (1874) ; Bullard v. Hamson, 4 M. & S. 387 (Eng.
1815) ; Proctor v. Hodgson, IO Exch. 324 (Eng. 1855) ; Wilks v. Greenway, 6 T. L. R. 449
(Eng. 189o).
2,Ewert v. Bortis, 12 Atl. 893 (N. J. Eq. 1888); Tibus v. Boston, lO7 Ky. 98, 51 S. W.
609 (1899); Golden v. Rupard, 25 Ky. L. Reg. 2125, 80 S. W. 162 (1904). See Orpin v.
Morrison, 230 Mass. 529, 12o N. E. 183 (1918).
'United States v. Rindge, 2o8 Fed. 611 (P. C. Cal. 923) ; Ward v. Robertson, 77 Iowa
159 (1889) ; Hildreth v. Googins, 91 Me. 227, 39 Atl. 550 (1898) ; Whitehouse v. Cummings,
83 Me. 91 (189o) ; Dee v. King, 73 Vt. 375, 5o Atl. 22o9 (29O2).
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the theory of implied grant or implied reservation.2 6 If the necessity is evidence
of the intent of the parties, then it is reasonable that unless absolutely necessary,
no intent should be implied, particularly against a grantee. But considered from
the viewpoint of public policy, it might well be argued that the easement ought
to be allowed whenever it is reasonably necessary to enable the owner to enjoy
is land. As regards the principle that a grant is to be construed most strongly
against the grantor, cases have held, and it is generally recognized, that this
principle has little or no application to cases of easements of necessity.
27
Irrespective of whether the doctrine of easement of necessity is based purely
on public policy, or is regarded as existing on the theory of presumed intention,
the doctrine seems perfectly applicable to cases involving subjacent support. It
is absolutely necessary to the use and enjoyment of land that it be supported,
both laterally and subjacently. Since it is impossible for the surface owner to
support his surface artificially if the subjacent owner removes the support
afforded by the subjacent land, and does not substitute a sufficient artificial
support, it is necessary to the use and enjoyment of the surface that the sub-
jacent owner either should not remove the support afforded by his land, or if he
does, that he supply a sufficient artificial support. Whether merely a reasonable
or a strict necessity is required to establish an easement of necessity, it is
obvious that either is satisfied in the case of subjacent support. In cases of
lateral support, in all of which it is theoretically possible for the landowner
himself to support his land laterally, without the co6peration of the adjacent
landowner, obviously only those few courts not requiring a strict necessity
would consider applying the doctrine of easement of necessity.28 The situation
in which the support of the subjacent land is involved is fairly analogous to that
in which two stories of an apartment house are owned by different persons, in
which cases the owner of the upper story has an easement of support in the
lower story.
29
If the surface owner, in the absence of a grant, release or parol agreement
to the contrary, is given an easement of support by necessity in the subjacent
land, what is the extent of the easement right? Is the easement limited to that
which is necessary for the use of the land in its natural state, or for the use
being made of it at the time of the grant, or for the reasonable use of the land,
or for any lawful use of the land? If the easement is based solely on social
considerations, then it ought to be adequate in scope to enable the dominant
owner to have the reasonable enjoyment of his land as long as the necessity
continues. If the easement is based on the intention imputed to the parties at
the time of the severance of the ownership, it follows that its extent should be
" Simonton, supra note IxI, at 580.
See Simonton, supra II, at 573, 6oi.
' The minority view allows an easement of necessity even though there be no strict neces-
sity. Pettingill v. Porter, 8 Allen i (Mass. 1864).
I The analogy was drawn in an English case. In Humphries v. Brogden, which held
that the owner of the surface is entitled to support from the subjacent strata, the court said:
"The books of reports abound with decisions restraining a man's acts upon and with his own
property, where the necessary or probable consequence of such acts is to do damage to others.
The case of common occurrence nearest to the present is, where the upper story of a house
belongs to one man and the lower to another. The owner of the upper story, without any
express grant, or enjoyment for any given time, has a right to the support of the lower
story. If this arises (as has been said) from an implied grant or covenant why is not a
similar grant or covenant to be implied in favor of the owner of the surface of land against
the owner of the minerals? If the owner of an entire house, conveying away the lower story
only, is without any express reservation, entitled to the support of the lower story for the
benefit of the upper story, why should not an owner of land, who conveys away the minerals
only, be entitled to the support of minerals for the benefit of the surface?" Humphries v.
Brogden, supra note 6, at 747.
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determined with reference to that which is necessary for the use of the premises
in the manner presumably contemplated by the parties at the time of such
severance. In the absence of any evidence on the subject, it would seem that
the parties should be presumed to have had in mind, at least, a reasonable use of
the land. The cases involving ways of necessity indicate that the scope of
easements of necessity should be such as to enable the dominant owner to enjoy
his land for all lawful purposes. The parties are presumed to have had in mind,
in the absence of evidence, any lawful use of the land.
In Myers v. Dunn, ° the owner of a tract of land, bounded by a highway
on the east, and another on the west, sold a center lot to K, with a right of way
across the west lot "for the purpose of carting wood". Later, K sold to de-
fendant, who built a dwelling house on the center lot, and claimed a way of
necessity over the east lot. The court held that he was entitled to it, saying,
"The owner of land has a right to the most profitable use, the most
beneficial enjoyment thereof, subject to limitations not necessary here to
be mentioned. He may erect buildings and raise grain upon, and dig ores
beneath it; and when, by their conveyance to defendant's grantor the ad-
ministrators imposed, in favor of the land granted, a way of necessity over
the locus quo, they are to be presumed to have intentionally done it for any
and all of these purposes; and the law will declare that it may be used for
all; for it desires and encourages proprietors to increase the value of their
land by building houses upon it and cultivating it." 3'
In Whittier v. Winkley,3 2 defendant's grantor impliedly reserved a way of
necessity over plaintiff's lot in favor of the defendant's lot. Defendant later
erected buildings on his lot, and claims that he is entitled to enlarge the existent
right of way for new purposes. In holding that he was so entitled,38 the court
said:
"If the fact of the necessity for the way is evidence that the parties
intended by the deed to recognize and establish such an easement, the fact
that it is necessary for all purposes to which the land is adapted, is evidence
that a general and not a limited way was intended. A deed conveying land
for all lawful purposes furnishes no evidence that the implied way of neces-
sity was intended to be used for the accomplishment of one of those pur-
poses only. The necessity is originally coextensive with all the lawful uses
for which the rear lot is capable, and is not created by the appropriation of
the land to those uses." 34
It being more than reasonable to say that the surface owner should have
an easement of support by necessity in the subjacent land, and since the ease-
ment of necessity, in the case of ways of necessity, has been held to exist in
favor of land for all lawful purposes, and clearly should exist at least in favor
of the land while it is being used reasonably, it would seem that a surface owner
should have a right to have his buildings supported by the subjacent land, cer-
tainly insofar as the buildings constitute a reasonable use of the land.
Since it is well established that if one conveys minerals beneath his land the
grantee may be entitled, on the theory of necessity, to use the surface for all
purposes necessary to the reasonable mining of the minerals-e. g., erecting air
'049 Conn. 71 (i88i).
Id. at 77.
62 N. H. 338 (882).
'Accord: Crotty v. Pocahontas Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E. 233 (913) ; Uhl v. Ohio
River R. Co., 47 W. Va. 59 (i899).
3162 N. H. at 341.
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shafts, water storage facilities, and machinery on the surface, or dumping waste
thereon 9--it seems only fair to give the surface owner a right to have his land
supported so long as he uses it reasonably. Clearly the mere fact that he erects
buildings thereon does not normally constitute an unreasonable use of the land.
Assuming a modern court would be willing to recognize a right in the sur-
face owner to have his buildings supported by the subjacent land on the doctrine
of easement of necessity, it would probably require that the surface owner
allege and prove that both tenements were derived from a common owner, and
also would probably admit evidence of a parol agreement of the parties, though
incapable of specific performance, to rebut the presumption of intention, still
used by most courts as the basis for the easement. The requirement of proof of
a common owner, as has been pointed out, is clearly not in accord with the real
basis for the doctrine of easement of necessity. The public policy upon which
the doctrine is based would merely require proof of the necessity. Though the
social interest behind the doctrine is not strong enough to prevail over the real
intent of the parties if adequately expressed, the admission of parol evidence
to show the real intent of the parties is opposed, it would seem, to the general
policies behind the parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds.3 6
In the absence of a "release" by the surface owner to the subjacent land-
owner of any duty to support buildings erected on the surface, every surface
owner should normally,3 7 without the necessity of tracing back to a common
owner, have a right to have his buildings supported by the subjacent land, cer-
tainly insofar as the buildings constitute a reasonable use of the land, and
evidence of a parol agreement to the contrary should not be admissible. In
effect this is giving the surface owner, according to the usual definition of
"natural rights" 31 a natural right to have his buildings supported by the subjacent
land. 9
J.E.D.
Baker v. Pittsburgh, 219 Pa. 393 (1907).
: See Note (1gg) 29 YALE L. J. 665.
"7 Since the real reason for giving the surface owner the right to have his buildings sup-
ported is one based on considerations of public policy, if, in an abnormal situation, it should
appear that it was for the best interest of the state that such right should not exist, it would
seem that the court would be justified in refusing to recognize it.
' Natural rights as we have seen, are those rights which every landowner has in the ab-
sence of any grant, incident to the ownership of land and not depending on any agreement
between the parties.
'The right, which the writer suggests should be given the surface owner, would clearly
be incident to the ownership of land and not dependent on any agreement between the parties.
And it would seem that an easement of necessity should be regarded as a natural right, one
of the normal rights of ownership in land. The real basis for the recognition of so-called
"natural rights" is the same as the real reason for giving the dominant tenement an easement
of necessity-a public policy favoring the occupation, cultivation, and development of land.
